(MORE: Gaddafi’s gift to Mali—civil war.)
“Mali’s army needs to be almost completely reformed,” says
Andrew Lebovich, a researcher on North African and Sahel
affairs, based in Washington. “For years, parts of the army
existed as a kind of patronage institution. Now some of the
best-trained and equipped segments of the military”—loyal
to the previous civilian government—”have been effectively
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Even if ECOWAS and Bamako launch an offensive, it’s hardly
guaranteed to succeed. They’re up against experienced, hard
-bitten fighters, used to maneuvering and slipping away in
the Sahel’s terrain. “If the military skill set and
political willpower is there,” says Gregory Mann, Mali
expert and professor of history at Columbia University, “I
imagine it would not be enormously difficult to remove these
Islamist fighters from urban centers like Timbuktu and Gao.”
What happens thereafter is a different matter, with the
increased likelihood of al-Qaeda-backed actions in West
African capitals. “A kind of urban guerrilla terrorism could
emerge that we haven’t seen before in this region,” says
Mann.
In another scenario, the ICG warns of the risk of ethnic and
communal bloodletting:
In a worst-case scenario, chaos would break loose in Bamako,
triggering the redeployment of the army, possibly led by even
more radical commanders; the buffer zone between north and
south would become the theatre of clashes between communal
militias and armed Islamist groups; and atrocities would be
committed against civilians. Another collapse of the state in
Bamako would spread unrest throughout the country, as the
regular army would be just as uncontrollable as the rebel
militias and groups in the north.
